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All aspects of an economy's response to trade policy, and particularly the distributional aspects, depend crucially on how labor adjusts, and the costs workers face in doing so (see , Slaughter (1998) , and Magee (1989) for extensive discussions of the distributional implications). However, for the most part trade theory has ignored the question of labor mobility, assuming either frictionless mobility or complete immobility. Moreover, most of the few existing theoretical treatments of labor mobility are hard to reconcile with key empirical features of labor mobility, in particular with the evidence on gross flows. Here, we set up a model that takes on these questions head on.
One can identify three ways in which trade theorists have handled labor adjustment in trade models. First is the traditional static approach used as a benchmark by many trade economists, which uses a model with 'specific factors,' factors that cannot adjust at all, for analysis of the short run, but a model with frictionless adjustment for analysis of the long run. Mussa (1974) , for example, uses the 'Ricardo-Viner' model for the short run, which features instantaneous adjustment for labor but no adjustment for any other factors, and the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which assumes no mobility costs for any factor, for the long-run. Of course, this approach offers no insight into dynamics, and assumes away mobility costs for workers.
Second are explicitly dynamic models with only net flows, such as Mussa's (1978) seminal model of intersectoral capital adjustment, in which adjustment is gradual because of convex adjustment costs for capital. A similar approach has sometimes been adopted for labor, by stipulating convex retraining costs, as in Karp and Paul (1994) and Dehejia (1997) . A feature of these models is that marginal adjustment costs are assumed to be zero when net movements of labor are zero, and so the long-run steady-state is the same as in a model with no adjustment costs (as in Heckscher-Ohlin). Dixit and Rob (1994) present a model with a constant cost to switching sectors, equal for all workers, in a stochastic environment. Feenstra and Lewis (1994) use a one-period model of worker adjustment to study compensation policies. Matsuyama (1992) models intergenerational labor adjustment.
All of the above papers have the property that all workers who switch sectors move in the same direction: Gross flows always equal net flows. This is a problem, since empirically gross flows of labor tend to be an order of magnitude larger than net flows (see Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) , or Jovanovic and Moffitt(1990) , Table 1 ). The third approach meets this difficulty by adopting search models of labor reallocation to a trade model. Hosios (1990), Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) , and Davidson and Matusz (2001) explore different aspects of this type of model, in which reallocation in response to liberalization is gradual because it takes time for workers to find jobs in the expanding sector. A survey of this approach with much discussion of empirical evidence is .
What we do in this paper is to develop a perfect-foresight neoclassical model of labor adjustment within a simple trade model, which does generate gross flows in excess of net flows, as the search models do, but does so through idiosyncratic shocks to workers' mobility costs rather than through search. This has the advantage that it allows us to use the powerful tools of duality theory, well known in trade theory, to derive a wide variety of analytical results not only about the steady state but also about the whole transition path. We thus combine a desirable feature of the neoclassical models (duality) with a desirable property of the search models (gross flows). This is a simplified and more tractable version of a more general model presented in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) . The general version is stochastic, can accommodate any number of industries and geographic regions within the country under study, and has the virtue that its main parameters can be econometrically estimated, as described in that paper. Here, we focus on the implications of the model for trade theory in a simple two-sector special case with one type of labor, which is simple and intuitive to use. A companion paper (Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (Forthcoming) ) studies the model through numerical simulations, and Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) estimates the structural parameters of the model and simulates the adjustment process.
The main results from this paper are: (i) Gross flows of labor always exceed net flows, so there are always workers moving across sectors, even in the steady state.
(ii) Equilibrium is unique, and there is no hysteresis, despite the presence of an unavoidable fixed cost to switching sectors.
(iii) Wage differentials persist across locations or sectors even in the long run, despite the fact that there are always some workers changing sectors. In particular, cancellation of a sector's tariff protection leads not only to a short-run drop in that sector's wage relative to the other sector, but also to a (smaller but still positive) drop in its relative wage in the long run. Thus, a frictionless model is not a good predictor for the steady state behavior of the model.
(iv) The economy adjusts only gradually to changes in policy. This is consistent with findings by Topel (1986) , Blanchard & Katz (1992) , and others. This complicates empirical work on trade and wages, however, because changes in wages and labor allocation will continue long after the change in policy has occurred.
(v) The economy begins to adjust to a policy change as soon as it is anticipated. Evidence of this has been noted in data on trade agreements (Freund and McLaren (1999) ). This complicates empirical work even more, because it means that adjustment begins before the policy change takes effect, and in fact changes in wages can reverse their direction when the policy change actually is executed.
(vi) The incidence of trade policy needs to be analyzed on the basis of lifetime utility, taking worker mobility and option value into account, and not simply on the basis of wage levels. We show how to do this. The correction is important: It is theoretically possible, for example, for a policy change to lower real wages in a sector both in the short run and in the long run, and yet for the workers in the sector to be better off as a result of it, because it raises those workers' option value. This is far from being only a theoretical possibility, as Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) show using US worker data.
(vii) Announcing a trade liberalization in advance tends to reduce the difference between its effect on export-sector workers and its effect on importcompeting workers. We show that this leads to worker unanimity in the limit, meaning that all workers agree on the desirability of the liberalization if it is announced far enough in advance. However, it is crucial to note that this can have the effect in the limit of making all workers beneficiaries of trade liberalization or of making them all net losers from it. Thus, the common presumption that a phased-in liberalization helps to cushion the blow to affected workers can be exactly wrong in some cases. We offer a simple condition that determines which way it will go.
Note that the hazards that these properties present for empirical work are eliminated if one estimates the structural parameters of a dynamic model and uses it as the basis for policy simulations. That is the approach taken in Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) .
Plan of paper: The following section lays out the basic model. Then one section presents results on the steady state of the model, and the following section presents results on dynamic adjustment. A further section discusses the incidence of policy changes in the model, taking lifetime utility into account, and analyzes the effect of pre-announcement of liberalization on the distribution of gains and losses. A final section summarizes.
The Basic Model.
There are two sectors, X and Y, each with a large number of competitive employers, who combine a sector-specific fixed (latent) factor with labor for production. The two sectors may be located in two separate regions and may require different skills, making it costly for workers to move between them. Without any costs of moving between sectors, and without any idiosyncratic shocks to workers, the economy would be a Ricardo-Viner model (Jones, 1971 ). We shall see that its equilibrium is very different from that model, both in its dynamic character and in its steady state.
The economy's workers form a continuum of measure L.
Production.
The quantity of aggregate output in sector i in period t is given by:
where L i t denotes labor used in sector i in period t. Assume that Q i (·) is increasing, continuously differentiable, and strictly concave.
The domestic price of good i, p i , is treated as exogenous. A central example, which will be treated explicitly, is of a small open economy in which the domestic price is equal to the given world price plus a tariff (export subsidy) for a good that is imported (exported). For now, we will assume that domestic goods prices are constant over time, but later we will extend the analysis to the case of an unanticipated or anticipated change due to a trade liberalization. Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) and Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) allow for the more general case of a stochastic process for domestic prices.
The wage in sector i in time t is competitively determined:
where w i t denotes the nominal wage paid by sector i at time t and p i denotes the domestic price of good i. Thus, the competitive employers in each sector each take the wage as given and maximize profit; the wage adjusts so that this wage just clears the spot labor market in that sector.
Labor Mobility.
A worker θ who is in industry i at the end of period t receives a non-pecuniary benefit ε i θ,t . This can be thought of as enjoyment of the work or of living in the region where industry i is located, for example. We assume that the ε i θ,t are independently and identically distributed across workers and sectors and over time, with cdf F (·), pdf f (·), and full support:
and mean zero:
The cost to a worker θ, who was in i during period t, of moving from i to j = i at the end of t is, then: ε i θ,t − ε j θ,t + C, where C ≥ 0 is the deterministic component of mobility costs, common to all workers (such as retraining or relocation costs, or psychic costs of moving to a new occupation). The variable ε i θ,t − ε j θ,t is the idiosyncratic component of moving costs, which can be negative as easily as it can be positive. For example, a worker may be bored with her current job and long for a change in career (ε i θ,t − ε j θ,t < 0), and a worker with a child in the final year of high school may have a non-pecuniary reason to stay in the current location rather than move, as might be necessary to change jobs (ε
Further, we make the boundedness assumption:
This ensures that the worker's problem is meaningful; if it was violated, the worker could ensure infinite utility simply by choosing the sector with the higher value of ε in each period.
Since what is important for workers' decisions is the difference between ε i and ε j , we can simplify notation by defining:
for a worker currently in sector i, where µ i θ,t is symmetrically distributed around mean zero, with cdf G(·) and pdf g(·) derived from F (·) and f (·).
The transition equations governing the allocation of labor are:
where m ji t denotes the fraction of labor force in j at the beginning of t that moves to i by the end of t, or in other words, the gross flow from j to i.
The timing of events can be summarized thus:
The stock of workers in each sector in each period is determined by events in the previous period. The current labor allocations together with current product prices determines wages through spot labor-market clearing. Then each worker learns her ε's and decides whether to remain in her current sector or move. In the aggregate, these decisions determine the following period's labor allocation.
Preferences and Expectations.
All agents are risk neutral, have rational expectations and have a common discount factor β < 1. Further, all workers have identical and homothetic prferences, which allows us to identify a common cost-of-living index. Letting good X be the numeraire, let the cost-of-living index be denoted φ(p Y ), an increasing function that has an elasticity (by Shepherd's lemma) equal to good Y 's share in consumption. Thus, the real wage w
Key Equilibrium Conditions.
An equilibrium is a moving rule characterized by a value of (µ X t , µ Y t ) each period (where a worker in i moves if and only if µ < µ i t ), such that the aggregate movements of workers induced by that rule generate a time path for wages in each sector that make the proposed moving rule optimal. Here we derive a key equation that is useful in characterizing equilibrium.
From (2), together with (3) applied to period t + 1, we know that
but using (2) applied to period t + 1, this becomes:
This is an important relationship for characterising the equilibrium behavior of the model. The interpretation is as follows. The cost of moving (C + µ 
Given this and the symmetry of the distribution of µ, the equilibrium reallocations of labor are given by the following relationships:
As a result, the intersectoral allocation of labor follows the following law of motion:
Here we will derive properties of the steady state, deferring discussion of the path to the steady state until the next section.
In discussing steady states, we will naturally drop time subscripts. The steady-state level of L X will be denoted L X . In addition, we will let µ stand for the steady-state value of µ X , and so the steady-state value of µ Y is given by −µ − 2C. Then L X can be derived from (7) as a function of µ, and written
The first result is a uniqueness property:
Proposition 1 There is a unique steady-state level of µ and L X .
Proof. Because the m ij and L i derive uniquely from µ, it suffices to prove uniqueness of the threshold µ. The value of µ is implicitly defined by the equilibrium condition, which comes directly from (5):
and
it is easily shown that the right-hand side of (8) is continuous and strictly decreasing in µ. Since the left-hand side is continuous and increasing on µ on (−∞, ∞), there is a unique solution for µ.
This result demonstrates the striking difference that the idiosyncratic effects make for the behavior of the model. If there were only common moving costs (C > 0) with no idiosyncratic shocks (µ ≡ 0), then there would be a range of steady states. Any allocation of labor such that |w X −w Y | < C(1−β) would then be a steady state, and this would be a non-degenerate interval of values of L X . These differences are illustrated in Figure 1 , which is the standard RicardoViner diagram adapted to our model. The length of the box is L, the downwardsloping curve is the marginal value product of labor in X, where the quantity L X is measured from the left axis, and the upward-sloping curve is the marginal value product of labor in Y , where the quantity L Y is measured from the right axis. All marginal products are deflated by the consumer price index φ(p Y ). The top panel shows the unique equilibrium for the Ricardo-Viner model, in which there are no moving costs at all. The equilibrium point is marked as L X RV , where wages in the two industries are equalized. The middle panel shows the range of labor allocations for which it would be unprofitable for workers to move for a model with C > 0 but µ ≡ 0, thus the range of steady states for a model with common, but not idiosyncratic, moving costs. Thus, in such a model, there would be hysteresis: The value of L X at which the system comes to rest would be determined by the initial conditions.
The bottom panel shows the outcome for the present model with both common and idiosyncratic moving costs. In the present model with gross flows, every year a trickle of people moves from one cell to another, and this constant stirring of the pot eventually removes the effect of initial conditions, yielding a unique steady state.
A second result, concerning wage differentials, makes it clear that the frictionless model does not predict behavior in the steady state of the model.
Proposition 2
In the steady state, the larger sector must have a higher wage:
But:
which yields a contradiction.
Thus, we can say that the long-run intersectoral elasticity of labor supply is finite. Note that this implies persistent wage differentials, even in long-run equilibrium, and even though in each period some fraction of the workers in each sector move to the other. The point is that if a given sector is to be larger than the other in the steady state, it must have a lower rate of worker exit than the other sector does. In order for that to be the case, it must have a higher wage. Put differently, suppose for the sake of argument that X and Y had the same wage and
Then the rate of exit from each sector would be the same, so a larger group of X workers would arrive in Y each period than the group leaving Y . This would put downward pressure on the wage in Y , opening up a wage differential in favor of X, the larger sector.
There is also an unambiguous relationship between the steady state of this model and the Ricardo-Viner equilibrium (which, recall, is the equilibrium of the model with C, µ ≡ 0). Specifically, the steady-state intersectoral allocation of workers always lies somewhere between the Ricardo-Viner model and equal division of workers between the sectors.
To see this, first let the allocation of workers to the X sector in the RicardoViner model, L X RV , be defined implicitly by:
Proposition 3
The following inequalties must hold in the steady state:
Proof. The result follows directly from the labor demand curves being downward sloping and Proposition 2. Suppose L 
< L
X .
An immediate implication is that, unlike a frictionless model, the equilibrium does not maximize national income, even at domestic prices, and even in the steady state. The reason is that each worker has non-pecuniary motives as well as pecuniary ones, and this has its effect on the aggregate allocation of labor. It is also clear that this is not an indication of market failure; workers should consider their non-pecuniary motives when making their decisions.
Steady-state impact of policy changes.
Let us assume that sector Y is the import-competing sector, and that it is initially protected by a tariff that raises the domestic price above the world price. The following two results analyze what happens to steady-state labor allocations and wages as a result of a change in the tariff.
First, the steady-state impact on labor allocations goes in the same direction as in a model with no mobility costs. For concreteness, consider two models, model I (for 'initial') and model N (for 'new'), identical except that in model N the tariff, and hence p Y , is lower than in model I. Denote the steady-state sector-X employment in the two models by L , and let the values of µ be µ I and µ N respectively. We will show that the direction of the steady-state impact of a labor demand shock is the same in our model as it is in the model with no mobility costs: (9) . At the same time:
Finally, as a last comparative static result, we note that wage differentials induced by policy persist. When the tariff on Y is removed, not only does the X-industry wage rise relative to the Y -industry wage in the short run, but as Proposition 4 shows, it will also do so in the long run.
Proposition 5 Using the notation of the previous problem, given that p
Proof. Suppose not. Then:
But we already know from the previous proposition that L X N > L X I , which implies that µ I > µ N , given (9) . This yields a contradiction.
In sum, the steady state of the model is unique and qualitatively different from the equilibrium of a frictionless model. It exhibits persistent wage differentials in favor of larger industries, produces more evenly-sized industries than a frictionless model, and does not maximize GDP. Now, we turn attention to the whole time-path of adjustment.
4 Dynamic adjustment.
Preliminaries.
It is in analyzing dynamics and welfare effects along the transition path that the tools of duality are useful for this model. Here we will see how. First, we will show the optimization problem that equilibrium solves (as noted above, it is not maximization of GDP). In the next subsection, we will see how that establishes basic dynamic properties, and in the next section we will use it to derive results on distributional effects along the transition path.
A general rule for labor allocation in this model could be characterized by two functions. The function d XY (L X , µ X ) gives the probability that a worker in X will move to Y in the current period, given the current stock L X of workers in X and the worker's idiosyncratic cost µ X of moving from
gives the probability that a worker in Y will move to X in the current period, given L X and the worker's idiosyncratic cost µ Proposition 6 Any equilibrium maximizes: Therefore, studying optimization problem (10) can tell us about the equilibrium. Note that this is a dynamic analogue to the revenue function maximized by equilibrium in a static neoclassical trade model (see Dixit and Norman 1980 
where
It is easy to show that T satisfies the usual Blackwell properties with respect to W , and that as a result T has a unique fixed point, which can be found as the unique uniform limit of iterations on the Bellman equation starting from any bounded candidate function.
The following observation is helpful in characterizing the system's dynamics, and is also proven as This result tells us that the equilibrium is unique, since in strictly concave optimization problems the optimum is unique. It also tells us that the function W (L X ) is strictly decreasing in L X . The following tells us that the value of this function is always equal to v X − v Y , which is very useful for analyzing dynamics, as will be seen shortly.
Proposition 8 In equilibrium at each date
Proof. First, note that in the optimization it is never optimal to have workers moving from i to j and at the same time other workers with lower values of µ who are remaining in i. (In that case, an equal number of workers from the two groups could have their actions reversed, leaving the future allocation of workers unchanged but reducing aggregate idiosyncratic moving costs.) Therefore, in an optimal allocation there is for each value of L X at each date a number µ
This means that we can rewrite the Bellman equation as follows.
The first-order conditions for this with respect to µ X and µ Y are
But then from (2), the result follows.
This tells us that in equilibrium, the attractiveness of either sector relative to the other is a strictly decreasing function of the number of workers who are located in that sector. Now we can use this to analyze the economy's dynamics.
Gradual adjustment to unanticipated changes.
The preceding analysis can be used to show a number of properties of the model's dynamic adjustment. First, labor market adjustments to any change, such as terms of trade shocks or policy changes, will be sluggish. In particular, suppose that the economy is in a steady state associated with an initial value of p Y , say p . If a one-time shock occurs (say, elimination of the tariff on good Y ) that results in a new value of p Y , say p , the economy will not reach the steady state associated with p in finite time.
To see this, consider Figure 2 . This illustrates the first-order condition (2), or equivalently, (13) , for choice of µ 
. One can, thus, interpret it as the marginal cost curve for the supply of X-workers: the height is the moving cost for the marginal worker moving to X, given that the total number who wind up in X at the end of this period is equal to L X t+1 . The downward sloping curve gives
). This can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of moving a worker from Y to X. Given L Provided that C > 0, this curve must be strictly increasing, with a slope strictly less than 1. Thus, there is a unique steady state, and if the system begins at a point other than the steady state, it will move toward it without ever reaching or overshooting it.
This provides the result. For example, if the system is initially at a steady state with a high tariff that is expected to continue permanently, and then the tariff is suddenly removed never to be restored, then the system will move toward the new steady state each period, attaining it only in the limit.
Gradual labor-market adjustment to external shocks and policy changes, and the persistent wage differentials that they imply, have been documented empirically by, among others, Topel (1986), Blanchard & Katz (1992) and Rappaport (2000) . They appear in the model of Davidson and Matusz (2001) , due to re-training and search delays and exogenous rates of individual job separation. They can also be rationalized by convex training costs for labor (as in Karp and Paul (1994) or Dehejia (1997) , in analogy with convex adjustment costs for capital as in Mussa (1978) ). Here, they result from the presence of time-varying idiosyncratic shocks to workers (even though those shocks are serially uncorrelated). Even if a worker is suffering low wages as a result of loss of protection to that worker's sector, it will often be in that worker's interest to wait until her personal moving costs are sufficiently low before leaving the sector.
Anticipatory adjustment to pre-announced changes.
Another feature of the model's dynamics is anticipatory adjustment. Suppose the economy is in an initial steady state with a tariff on imported good Y , and a domestic price of p Y = p . At time t = 0, the government announces a surprise policy change-elimination of the tariff-starting at some date t * > 0. At that date and thenceforth, the domestic price of Y will be equal to the world price, p < p . We will see that anticipatory net outflows of labor from sector Y will begin immediately from the time of the announcement.
Although the environment is no longer stationary as in the previous sections, the logic of Proposition 6 still applies, and the perfect-foresight equilibrium still solves the planner's problem (10) with p Y = p for t = 0, . . . , t * and p Y = p for t > t * . The value function will, however, depend on the date as well as the current labor allocation, and it is useful to write it as W t (L X ; p , p , t * ) to keep track of the parameters of the problem. Note from (1) that ceteris paribus, a rise in p Y will raise the real wage in the Y sector and lower it in the X sector, or w 
(ii) Let W and W be bounded, concave, and differentiable functions on [0, L], with W > W everywhere. Then, for any value of
Proof. By the envelope theorem, we have:
Using (13) and (4) and rearranging, this becomes the following. (14) (i) Comparing p with p , (13) shows that the optimal choice of µ Y t for a given L X t will be the same for both. This implies that the only difference in (14) is in the first two terms, which take a higher value for p since the X wage is higher and the Y wage is lower. This proves the result. (ii) If we replace W with W , then in the first-order condition for the optimization in
, the marginal benefit curve shifts up (recall Figure 2) . Thus, for any L X t , we have a rise in the value of µ Y t that is chosen. The first two terms of (14) 
for any L X . The first inequality results from part (ii) of the Lemma because W I = T (W I ; p ), and W given L X t (see Figure 2) , we see that (15) implies that the transition function for period t * − 1 lies strictly in between the transition function for model I and that for model N. This is illustrated in Figure 4 . By the same logic, the transition function for period t * − 2 must lie strictly between that for t * − 1 and that for model I, and so on. Then if we were already in a steady state of model I and it was announced (to everone's surprise) at date 0 that the tariff would be removed at date t * , the dynamics of the system would follow the path indicated in Figure 4 , drawn for the assumption that t * = 3. Adjustment toward the new steady state would begin immediately at date 0, and would continue permanently, always moving toward the new steady state but never reaching it.
Of course, anticipatory labor adjustments also imply anticipatory wage changes. In particular, anticipatory outflows from Y prior to the actual tariff removal will progressively raise w Y up to the time of the policy change, at which point it will fall discretely, and will progressively push down w X up to the time of the policy change, at which point it will rise discretely due to the drop in the consumer's price index. This has obvious implications for empirical analyses of the impact of trade liberalization on wages.
In particular, suppose that a researcher obtains data on wages and employment levels at dates t * − 1 and t * + 1, and compares the values before and after the liberalization. If the differences thus observed are interpreted to be the effects of the liberalization, then because the anticipatory effects are omitted, the study will greatly overestimate the wage effects and underestimate the sectoral employment effects.
Welfare and Incidence.
A large part of the reason for studying the workings of a model with labor mobility costs is to refine our understanding of who gains and who is hurt from a change in trade policy. Here we will look at two different angles of this question. First, a simple envelope result shows how the effect on a given worker can be expressed in terms of flow probabilities and changes in wages only. This result shows the importance of gross flows in analyzing incidence, which is ignored in the vast majority of empirical work. Second, we derive some results on how delayed trade liberalization can affect who gains and who loses from a reform.
An envelope result.
Return again to the case with constant p Y . Consider again an unannounced and permanent change in tariff, which changes the value of p Y once and for all. Returning to (3), we can see that the change in the utility of a worker in sector i would be:
where w i * t , v i * t and µ i * t denote the equilibrium values of the wage, worker's utility, and moving threshold in sector i and at date t respectively. Noting that Ω (µ) = G(µ), this means:
t+1 /dp Y − dv i * t+1 /dp Y ], or dv i * t /dp Y = dw i * t /dp Y + βdv i * t+1 /dp
t+1 /dp Y .
Recalling (6) and following the recursive logic forward, this becomes:
where π ik t is the probability that a worker who was in i at time 0 will be in k at time t. Thus, despite the moving costs, a properly constructed discounted sum of wages alone, using gross flows to average across sectors, is sufficient for evaluating incidence.
Note again that this has implications for empirical work. It suggests that looking at change in an industry's wages is not enough to tell whether workers in that industry have benefitted or not. In particular, it is quite possible to construct examples in which a drop in tariff lowers wages in sector Y in the short run and in the long run, and yet every worker in the economy, benefits, including those in Y . 2 The reason is that real wages in X rise by enough, and the economy is fluid enough, that current Y workers expect to make up in future employment in X for what they have lost in Y . This also stands in stark contrast to the convex-adjustment cost approach (Karp and Paul, 1994; Dehejia, 1997) ; in equilibrium in those models, a Y -worker must be indifferent between leaving Y and remaining there permanently, and so would definitely be worse off if Y wages were to fall permanently.
5.2
The effects of policy delay on incidence. 
Suppose that the two goods are perfect substitutes in consumption so that φ(p
Y is initially slightly above 1 but then drops to a point well below 1, w Y will fall slightly but by letting p Y fall sufficiently close to 0, w X can be made arbitrarily large. Eventually, Y -workers will value the option of moving to X enough to compensate them for their small current wage loss.
scheduled to be phased in over ten years, with most of the reduction loaded at the end of the phase-in period. One reason for this is to soften the effects of the reform on workers likely to be hurt by it, giving them time to adjust and perhaps removing an incentive to oppose the reform politically. This motive is studied by Dehejia (2003) , in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with convex adjustment costs for workers (and zero steady-state flows of workers). In that model, it is shown that gradual phase-in can bring all workers behind a trade liberalization that would otherwise have been opposed by import-competing workers, making the reform politically feasible.
We will here study the effect of delayed trade liberalization in the present model. To study a simple version of the problem that makes the mechanisms clear, we focus on a stark liberalization that brings the economy from autarchy to free trade. Beginning from an autarchic steady state, the opening of trade may either occur immediately or be announced (with full commitment) to occur at a later date. In contrast to Dehejia, we find that delay does not, in general, soften the blow of trade liberalization to workers. What it does do, if the period of delay is long enough, is to unite all workers, so that they all either benefit from trade or lose from it. To anticipate, it turns out that if an increase in labor supply increases the economy's long-run relative supply of export goods (as it does in Dehejia's model), then delay fosters unification of workers behind free trade, but if an increase in labor supply decreases longrun relative supply of export goods, delay fosters unification of workers in opposition to free trade.
or the derivative of a worker's payoff with respect to the world price, evaluated at a value of the world price equal to the domestic autarchic price, then
; p , p , ∞) = 0) one has signed the i worker's willingness to consent in an interval for p that includes p . That is the approach taken here.
Denote the equilibrium employment in sector i at time t, as a function of initial labor stocks, by , but we will need to evaluate these functions only at the point p = p , so these additional arguments will be suppressed.) The following will be useful.
Lemma. Assume that the value function is twice continuously differen-
Parts (i) and (iv) are technical preliminaries. The result in (iv) requires proof, since even when a series of functions converges uniformly to a limit function, in general the sequence of derivatives does not converge to the derivative of the limit series. In this case the result follows because the functions are solutions to an optimisation problem. Parts (ii) and (iii) follow directly from the model's dynamics. For example, if one was to add some workers to X in period 0, that would result in more X workers in each period, but the number of X workers would fall over time, as workers reallocate toward the Y sector. With a slight abuse of notation, we will write L Henceforth, we will assume that the planner's value function is twice continuously differentiable in all arguments.
With this notation, the effect on the payoff of a worker in X is:
by Young's theorem, which by the envelope theorem becomes: (ii) The net benefit to workers in the import-competing sector from the opening up of trade is strictly less than the benefit to export sector workers, whether the opening is delayed or not.
(iii) A one-period delay hurts export-sector workers and benefits importcompeting workers.
(iv) A sufficiently long delay before the opening of trade will make workers in both sectors net beneficiaries [net losers] from trade.
Proposition 10 Suppose that, at the autarchy relative price p , steady state relative supply of the export good is unchanged at the margin by an increase in labor supply. Then there is an open interval containing p such that if the world price p is in that interval:
(i) Workers in the export sector as of period 0 will benefit from the opening of trade, whether it is delayed or not.
(i) Workers in the import-competing sector as of period 0 will be hurt by the opening of trade, whether it is delayed or not.
Some examples. Four simple special cases illustrate the different effects delay can have. For all examples, assume that p < p , so that Y is the import good, and that the difference between the world price and the domestic autarchy price is small enough that the propositions apply. (As a result, sectori workers benefit from trade if
, an increase in total labor supply will result in an equiproportionate increase in output of both sectors. (Note that w X and w Y are both independent of labor supplies, and so, by (8) , µ is unchanged by a change in labor supply.) Therefore, B ∞ = 0, and in this case delay has no role: export sector workers benefit from trade and import-competing workers are hurt by it, regardless of t * .
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(ii) Inelastic import-competing labor demand. Suppose that both X and Y are produced by a sector-specific asset in fixed supply (K X and K Y respectively) together with labor. Suppose further that the production function for Y is Leontieff:
and that the production function
1/ρ , with ρ < 1, ρ = 0 (implying an elasticity of substitution equal to 1/(1 − ρ)). In this case, Q Y t1 = Q Y t2 = 0∀t. Therefore, B t , D t ≤ 0∀t, with strict inequality for t > 0, so both groups of worker will benefit from trade with or without delay. The interpretation is that the increased labor demand in the export sector forces wages up in the import-competing sector because of its inelastic labor demand, benefitting all workers.
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(iii) Inelastic export-sector labor demand. Now, reverse the production functions for the two sectors. In this case, Q X t1 = Q X t2 = 0∀t. Therefore, B t , D t ≥ 0∀t, with strict inequality for t > 0, so both groups of worker will be hurt by trade with or without delay. The interpretation is that the reduced labor demand in the import-competing sector forces wages down in the export sector because of its inelastic labor demand, hurting all workers. In this example, all of the gains from trade are captured by the owners of the fixed factors.
(iv) An example in which delay tips the scales in favor of trade. Now consider a general CES specification, in which
shows that with any finite ρ X and with ρ Y sufficiently large and negative, import-competing workers strictly benefit from an unannounced liberalization. Example (iii) shows that with any finite ρ Y and with ρ X sufficiently large and negative, import-competing workers are strictly hurt by an unannounced liberalization. Choose any two such parameter pairs, and connect them with a curve in (ρ X , ρ Y ) space. There must be a point on the curve at which import-competing workers are indifferent between a sudden trade opening and the autarchic steady state. For this parameter pair, by part (ii) of Proposition 9, export workers are strict beneficiaries of sudden trade. In addition, export workers will remain net beneficiaries of trade if the opening is delayed (B ∞ must be negative, because in order for Y workers to be indifferent, D ∞ must be negative; but then B t < 0∀t). Furthermore, since D 0 > 0 and D t is decreasing in t, any delay will make the Y workers strict beneficiaries of trade. Thus, an immediate liberalization would benefit X workers but not Y workers, but a delayed liberalization would strictly benefit both classes of worker. (A slight perturbation of the (ρ X , ρ Y ) pair could then make the Y workers stictly hurt by immediate trade opening, making them strict beneficiaries of delayed opening.)
The interpretation of this result is as follows. An unexpected trade opening pushes down the real wages of Y workers immediately, while pushing up the real wages of X workers. The Y workers move only gradually to take advantage of the higher X wages because of the moving costs. However, if the trade opening is announced in advance, Y workers who happen to have low moving costs at the moment begin moving to X in anticipation. This makes Y workers more scarce, pushing up wages for those who do not move (while pushing X wages down), even though no change in output prices has yet occurred. If the elasticity of labor demand in the Y sector is sufficiently low, this anticipatory wage increase is the dominant effect.
(v) An example in which delay tips the scales against trade. Exactly the same logic as in (iv) can be used to construct a case in which export sector workers are indifferent between immediate trade and the autarchic steady state. In this case, by part (ii) of Proposition 9, import-competing workers are strictly hurt by trade whether it is delayed or not (since D ∞ must be positive, because in order for X workers to be indifferent, B ∞ must be positive; but then D t > 0∀t). Furthermore, since B 0 < 0 and B t is increasing in t, any delay will make the X workers strictly harmed by trade. Thus, in the event of an immediate liberalization, workers would be divided over trade, while delay would unite all workers in their opposition. (Again, a slight perturbation of the example can make X workers strict beneficiaries of immediate trade.)
The interpretation of this example is as follows. From the point of view of the X workers, immediate trade has three effects. It lowers real wages in the Y sector; it provides an immediate increase in real wages in the X sector; and it pushes a certain number of Y workers out of the Y sector and into the X sector over time, pushing X wages down. If labor demand in X is sufficiently inelastic, the X wage will be lower in the long run than it was under autarchy. Thus, in this example, for a X worker, the benefit from free trade is short-lived, and must be weighed against a long-run cost. On the other hand, if the trade opening is announced in advance, Y workers begin moving into X right away, pushing X wages down even before output prices change. Thus, X workers lose the benefit of the short-run wage increase that they would have enjoyed under unanticipated trade, and jump immediately to the long-run cost of increased competition from former Y workers.
These examples serve to illustrate the range of possible outcomes. Except in the knife-edge case with B ∞ = D ∞ = 0, delay tends to make workers unanimous in their stance toward trade, but whether it is a positive or negative stance depends on the relative responsiveness of labor demand in the two sectors. Of course, whether delay in any given real world liberalization event is likely to turn workers into beneficiaries or victims of trade is an empirical matter. Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) simulate equilibria of this model for a range of parameters in order to illustrate these points and to explore the magnitudes of delay required to achieve unanimity of workers. For middling values of the elasticity of substitution, unanimity can require decades of delay.
Conclusion.
We have studied a simple trade model with costly labor mobilty and idiosyncratic moving-cost shocks. The model is shown to have non-trivial dynamics, including gradual adjustment and anticipatory effects, resulting solely from fixed moving costs plus time-varying idiosyncratic moving cost shocks to individual workers. A key conclusion is that the steady state does not resemble a model with frictionless labor mobility. Specifically, intersectoral wage differentials persist permanently, making workers more expensive in larger sectors. In addition, trade liberalization lowers the long-run wage in the import-competing sector relative to the export sector, and delaying liberalization reduces the difference between the effect of liberalization on export-sector and on importcompeting workers.
Thus, the trade economist's habit of assuming that a frictionless model will be a good predictor of long-run trade effects is called into question. 
